Dynamics we can believe in: a view from the Amsterdam School on the centenary of Evert Willem Beth by Cédric Dégremont & Jonathan Zvesper
Synthese (2011) 179:223–238
DOI 10.1007/s11229-010-9779-2
Dynamics we can believe in: a view from the Amsterdam
School on the centenary of Evert Willem Beth
Cédric Dégremont · Jonathan Zvesper
Received: 11 July 2009 / Accepted: 17 November 2009 / Published online: 9 October 2010
© The Author(s) 2010. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract Logic is breaking out of the confines of the single-agent static paradigm
that has been implicit in all formal systems until recent times. We sketch some recent
developments that take logic as an account of information-driven interaction. These
two features, the dynamic and the social, throw fresh light on many issues within logic
and its connections with other areas, such as epistemology and game theory.
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Logic is breaking out of the confines of the single-agent static paradigm that has
been implicit in almost all formal logic until recent times. That is the message of
van Benthem (1996, 2003). In this paper we sketch some recent developments in this
direction, part of a new paradigm that sees logic as an account of information-driven
agency, which is typically multi-agent and interactive. These two features, the dynamic
and the social, throw fresh light on many issues within logic and its connections with
other areas.
Our focus will be on how these themes have been developed within our own research
community. However, in keeping with the interactive character of these developments,
our aim in this paper is not to be insular! We rather wish to highlight the fruits that
can be bourn by reflecting on how dynamics and interaction, concrete or abstract, can
be introduced into traditionally static or mono-agent disciplines.
After introducing the key notions of dynamic epistemic logic in Sect. 1, we will
see an application, due to van Benthem (2004) in formal epistemology, specifically to
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Fitch’s paradox, before summarising some logical work on dynamics of belief rather
than knowledge in Sect. 3. Then we will mention applications in game theory, and
focus on such applications in Sects. 5 and 6.
1 From static to dynamic epistemic logic
We do not pretend to have a definition of Logic as a field of inquiry, but it could be
characterised approximately as the formal study of reasoning. Traditionally, the par-
ticular object of this study has, albeit implicitly, concerned a single agent reasoning
in isolation. To put it another way: logicians have studied valid inference without any
reference to who is doing the inferring.
Although in many cases we do reason in isolation, there is clearly a natural multi-
agent component to much of our actual reasoning.1 This takes two forms: we reason
about other people, and also with other people.
Hintikka (1962) can be credited with a systematic introduction of the explicit rea-
soning subject into the domain of logic, with the invention of what is known as ‘episte-
mic logic’, studying validities for logical operators Ki and Bi , meaning respectively
‘i knows …’ and ‘i believes …’. (Hintikka does also briefly discuss the multi-agent
case, with operators Ka, Kb etc., remarking for example that Ka Kbϕ → Kaϕ should
be a theorem.)
We assume some familiarity with modal languages and their relational semantics;
for more details see e.g. Blackburn et al. (2001). Let EL denote the basic modal lan-
guage, obtained by adding modalities Ki for each i of a fixed set of agents, to some base
propositional language. We interpret EL over relational models. Relational semantics
is a possible worlds semantics, with a relation ∼i for each modality Ki . If s ∼i t , then
if the actual world were s then i would consider it possible that the world is actually
t . In order to interpret the operator Kiϕ as meaning that i knows that ϕ, it is natural to
ask that ∼i be an equivalence relation, and so Ki be an S5 modality.
The concept of common knowledge, first formalised in Aumann (1976), is also
often considered in epistemic logic, by including an operator CGϕ for the group of
agents G. Intuitively CGϕ means that all agents in G know ϕ, all agents in G know
that all agents in G knows ϕ and so on. Semantically, this fixpoint notion corresponds
to taking the transitive closure of the union of the relations for the agents in G.
Building on this static epistemic logic, ‘dynamic epistemic logic’ (DEL) includes
into the language operators 〈α〉, meaning ‘after the event α occurs …’. In adding
these dynamic operators to static epistemic logic, DEL merges ideas from philosophy
and computer science, and has been the engine of the research program described in
this paper. Baltag et al. (1999) and Gerbrandy (1999) were seminal in the develop-
ment of DEL. van Ditmarsch (2000) found applications of DEL to reasoning about
parlour games, and the first textbook devoted to DEL has recently appeared (van
Ditmarsch et al. 2007). DEL is a generalisation of public announcement logic (PAL,
Plaza 1989). PAL includes modalities 〈!ϕ〉, meaning ‘after ϕ is (publically and truth-
1 Furthermore, if we are to follow Wittgenstein, then language itself and so also (symbolic) reasoning are
fundamentally social phenomena.
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Fig. 1 A public announcement
of a Moore-like sentence
fully) announced, …’. Given an epistemic model M, let M|ϕ be its relativization to
ϕM = {w | M, w  ϕ}. The truth condition for public announcements is then:
Definition 1 (Truth condition for public announcements)
M, w  〈!ϕ〉ψ iff M, w  ϕ and M|ϕ,w  ψ
A pleasing feature of the model-changing PAL/DEL approach is that it correctly
handles “blindspots” (Sorensen 1988) like Moore sentences p ∧¬Ki p. The essential
point about these sentences, that is clarified by DEL, is that they can be examples of
true sentences that cannot be learned. Figure 1 shows what happens when we apply a
simple public announcement of such a sentence to a model: Circles are states (possible
worlds), and lines labeled with a letter indicate the ‘indistiguishability relation’ ∼i
for the corresponding player (we do not draw the reflexive lines, nor will we draw
the transitive lines in what follows). The actual world is denoted by a double circle.
There initially A does not know p, then there is an announcement that “p is true but
A does not know it”, so an announcement !ϕ :=!(p ∧ ¬K A p). The important point
from this elementary example is just that after the announcement, A does know p,
and knows that she knows it. Therefore after the announcement of ϕ, ϕ is not known!
Notice though that this fits with our intuition: what we would learn, if somebody tells
us a Moore sentence, is that it was true at the moment just before it was uttered.2
The dynamics of information are thus well handled by PAL, but PAL only allows
for very simple kinds of information. What about other epistemic events than just
announcements? Interesting epistemic events that are not covered by public announce-
ment logic include lies, partial information, private announcements, …. Gerbrandy and
Groeneveld (1997) considered one small generalisation: public announcements to sub-
groups. Full DEL allows much more. The key idea is to use models for events, just as
we have models for states in standard (static) epistemic logic.
Definition 2 An event model for the agents N is a tuple (E, (∼i )i∈N , P RE), where
E is a non-empty set of events, each ∼i is an equivalence relation over W , and
pre : E → L gives the ‘precondition’ of each event.
In order to combine static models with event models, DEL uses the product oper-
ation given in Definition 3. The idea is to interpret the indistinguishability relation in
the event models in the same way as in the static models, so that e ∼i d means that
if the event e actually happens, then agent i considers it possible that what is actually
happening is d. Definition 3 is just a formal working out of this intuition.
2
“Moore sentences” are named G.E.Moore, who remarked on the paradoxical nature of the first-person
statement ‘It is raining and I don’t believe it.’ (Moore 1942). The correct treatment of Moore sentences by
DEL will be relevant to the discussions below of AGM belief revision and of Fitch’s paradox.
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Definition 3 Given an epistemic model M = (W, (∼i )i∈N , V ) and an event model
E = (E, (∼i )i∈N ,pre), the product update of M by E , written M ⊗ E , is the
epistemic model with the domain of pairs {(w, e) ∈ W × E | M, w  P REe},
the relation (w, e) ∼i (w′, e′) iff w ∼i w′ and e ∼i e′, and the valuation of p is
{(w, e) ∈ W × E | w ∈ V (p)}.
The idea is that when you apply an event model to a state model, you generate a
new state model, in which the states are just the pairs (s, e), where s was a state in the
original model and e is an event that could in principle have occured. Those events
that could not have occured are ruled out by the precondition clause: if s  ¬P REe,
then e could not in principle occur. Then the definition of the new relation in the
new model is indeed a straightforward working out of the intuition described above:
(s, e) ∼i (t, d) means that i considers (t, d) possible if the actual state was s and e
happened. This will hold only if: (a) at s, i considered t to be possible, and (b) when
e occurs, i considers d to be possibly occuring.
It is then easy to see how we might define a language with action modalities of
the form 〈, e〉, where  is an action model and e an event in it, with the following
semantics:
Definition 4 (Truth definition for epistemic events)
M, w  〈, e〉ϕ iff M, w  pre(e) and M ⊗ , (w, e)  ϕ
As an illustration of DEL, suppose that three people, Alice Bob and Claire, are
playing cards. To make the example very simple, suppose that there are only three
cards, 1, 2 and 3, distributed one to each player. Then there are 6 possible scenarios. If
we suppose that all this is common knowledge among Alice Bob and Claire, then we
can draw the static epistemic model given in Fig. 2. The states are labelled according
to the distribution of cards, so that in the actual world, Alice has 1, Bob has 2 and
Claire has 3. Now suppose that Bob shows Claire his card. Part of this action is effec-
tively an announcement to Bob and Claire, that Claire knows to be truthful, that Bob
has card 2. We model this with the event model that is depicted in Fig. 3, where the
language has propositional variables of the form in meaning that player i has card n,
e.g. a1 means Alice has 1. Here the preconditions are written inside the nodes repre-
senting the states. In this model, Alice is uncertain what event has actually taken place.
That is, Alice knows that Bob has shown Claire his card (we assume that everybody
sees everybody seeing Bob’s action), but she doesn’t know which precondition the
action had. That is, for all Alice knows, Bob showed Claire card 3. It might seem
odd to the reader that in the event model Alice considers it possible that b1 was the
precondition for the action. Of course, in the actual context Alice will not consider this
possibility, and the concerned reader can check that the updated model, as depicted
in Fig. 4, does indeed conform with her understanding of what would happen. The
point is that we, in effect, encode Bob’s uncertainty via Alice’s relation, in the sense
that Bob considers it possible that Alice has card 3, and so considers it possible that
Alice considers it possible that the event that took place was Bob showing Claire 1.
In this particular situation, the effect of the event model has in effect been to cut some
indistinguishability links from the original model. However, in general the results of
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Fig. 2 A model of the initial epistemic situation of Alice, Bob, and Claire
Fig. 3 An event model of Bob
showing Claire his card
Fig. 4 A model of the situation after Bob has shown Claire his card
event models can be much more drastic, expanding the model or reducing it in many
ways.
Indeed, Baltag and Moss (2004) go so far as to state that that DEL is in some sense
complete for social epistemic situations. This statement is made in the form of two
theses that we do not reproduce here since they are long and carefully worded but the
gist is that DEL essentially as it is presented here is able to capture every epistemic
feature of any social situation including its dynamics. So the example we gave with
cards above would just be an instantiation of this, and every such situation could be
represented by a static model and an event model. Their theses are reminiscent of the
Church-Turing thesis, in that they relate an informal set of phenomena with a formal
mathematical definition. As such it is of course hard if not impossible to verify the
thesis. They are bold claims but far from implausible.
What about the logics themselves? How do we axiomatise PAL or DEL? This
depends on the underlying language, but if we take it to be the basic modal language
EL, things are quite nice for the logician. Indeed by mean of a compositional analysis
we can show e.g. that EL is at least as expressive as PAL. A compositional analysis
gives us a procedure to recursively translate any formula from PAL+EL back into EL.
All we have to do it to check whether each clause or reduction axiom is sound.
Proposition 5 (Compositional Analysis of PAL) The following axioms are sound with
respect to the class of all epistemic models.
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1. 〈!ϕ〉p ↔ (ϕ ∧ p)
2. 〈!ϕ〉¬ψ ↔ (ϕ ∧ ¬〈!ϕ〉ψ)
3. 〈!ϕ〉(ψ ∨ χ) ↔ (〈!ϕ〉ψ ∨ 〈!ϕ〉χ)
4. 〈ϕKiψ ↔ (ϕ ∧ Ki →〉ϕψ)
Furthermore, given any set of event models, axiomatizing the dynamic epistemic
logic having modalities for all these events can also be done by means of reductions
axioms following the following general scheme.
Proposition 6 (Action-Knowledge reduction axiom Baltag et al. 1999) The following
axiom is sound on the class of all epistemic models
[,e]Kiϕ ↔ (pre(e) →
∧
{Ki [, f]ϕ : e ∼i f })
Logically speaking, PAL internalises relativisation. Therefore some readers might
not find it surprising that many formal languages are closed for public announcements,
i.e. that adding public announcement operators does not increase the expressivity of
the underlying static language. But let us consider the language of epistemic logic
with common knowledge. In this case adding public announcement operators strictly
increases the expressive power of the logics. In such a case completeness via reduc-
tion axioms is no longer an option, the logicians has two options: prove completeness
with Henkin-style tools or extend the underlying static language in such a way that it
becomes closed again under relativisation (see van Benthem et al. 2006).
2 Formal epistemology
We will look here at one example where the dynamic logic approach has been brought
to bear on one topic from formal epistemology: the problem of Fitch’s Paradox.
Some forms of anti-realism uphold the verificationist thesis, that every truth can be
known. Letting ♦ capture what we mean here by ‘can’, we formalise the verificationist
thesis by the following schema, that we are allowed to instantiate with any formula ϕ:
ϕ → ♦Kiϕ, (V)
That is: if ϕ is true then it is possible (for someone) to know that ϕ is true. This might
seem like a reasonable thesis, and certainly not enough by itself to unseat verification-
ism as a tenable metaphysical stance.
We say that an agent who knows every truth is omniscient. The following theorem,
appears in Fitch (1963), where it is attributed to an anonymous referee of an earlier
(1945) unpublished paper:3
3 The referee, it later transpired, was Alonzo Church (Brogaard and Salerno 2008).
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Theorem 7 (Fitch) For each agent who is not omniscient, there is a true proposition
which that agent cannot know.
The contrapositive of this statement is that if an agent can know every true propo-
sition, then that agent is omniscient, i.e. does in fact know every true proposition. In
a logical notation with quantifiers over propositions, we would write this as (F).
(∀ϕ(ϕ → ♦Kiϕ)) → ∀ϕ(ϕ → Kiϕ) (F)
Given (F), the verificationist thesis (V) entails that the agent is omniscient! This the-
orem of Fitch has been used to argue for metaphysical realism (Hart and McGinn
1976), or at least against verificationism, and some verificationists have even seen it
as a serious challenge worth addressing (Dummett 1976).
In formalising philosophical arguments, and drawing philosophical conclusions
from the formal conclusions, ideally one would not add or lose anything from the
original philosophical statements. However, in useful formalisations some things are
of course lost or added, for example Fitch himself noticed that the temporal aspect
is missing from his rather limited analysis of the “value concept” (his expression) of
knowledge:
“For purposes of simplification, the element of time will be ignored in dealing
with these various concepts.” (Fitch 1963, p. 136)
Since dynamic epistemic logic deals with the interface between time and knowledge,
it is unsurprising that DEL-style thinking has led to a resolution of this paradoxical
result. van Benthem (2004) observes that essential to Fitch’s result (and indeed to
others from the same paper) is a judicious manipulation of a Moore-like sentence
p ∧ Ki p.
The DEL methodology is a correct way to integrate the “element of time” into the
model. Recall the example given in Fig. 1. There we saw an annoucement that was
such that after the announcement the announced sentence is not known (indeed, its
negation is known). We mentioned that the intuitive idea is that one learns, when a
Moore sentence is announced, is that is was true. Blindspots like Moore sentences
cannot, as a matter of principle, be known by any agent ideal enough to have positive
introspection (i.e. such that if she knows something then she knows that she knows
it). The existence of unknowable truths is indeed the opposite of verificationism, but
this kind of unknowable truth is surely not what the verificationist has in mind when
denying their existence! Philosophers could long have suspected that there was some-
thing fishy going on with Fitch’s paradox, and the DEL methodology indeed reveals
precisely what this is.
Building on the observations of van Benthem, Balbiani et al. (2008) flesh out the
♦ operator, characterising ‘knowability’ as ‘known after some announcement’. They
therefore develop ‘arbitrary public announcement logic’, in which ♦, written as 〈!〉,
means ‘after some public announcement …’, and give expressivity and completeness
results for the resulting logic.
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3 Belief change
One area in which DEL as presented is inadequate is in dealing with beliefs rather
than knowledge. Beliefs have the characteristic that they must be revisable: you might
believe p right now, but could learn that ¬p. The form of DEL that we have pre-
sented is not appropriate for modeling this kind of reasoning. Yet belief revision is a
logical process which should have rational constraints to it. It is also a process that
interactive epistemologists from game theory are recognising as important, in what
Brandenburger (2007) calls the “belief-based approach”. We therefore now turn to
look at ways in which the DEL methodology can be cashed out to reason properly
about beliefs rather than about knowledge.
The dynamic perspective characterises knowledge as the strong, indefeasible, result
of “hard information”. In many situations the relevant hard information may be lack-
ing, with enough uncertainty remaining at the epistemic level for the agent to have
recourse to beliefs as a basis for action. In contrast with knowledge, the beliefs of an
agent are defeasible, so the agent is ready to give up her beliefs in the light of incoming
information. This opens the door to so-called “belief revision” theory.
3.1 AGM
Initial logical investigations in belief revision were led by Alchourrón et al. (1985)
(the authors called belief revision “theory change”). In the framework of that paper,
a belief state is represented by a set  of formulas (of e.g. a propositional language,
that we call the “object language”). Revision is then a syntactic operation taking a
set  and a formula ϕ, and returning  ∗ ϕ, a new set of sentences. Alchourrón et
al. (1985) proposed and studied some rational constraints on such functions, known
as the AGM postulates. As proved in Grove (1988), these constraints have an elegant
semantic analogue: a revision function  ∗ (·) respects the postulates just if it is defin-
able in terms of a pre-order ≤ over the maximally consistent sets of sentences of the
object language, with  ∗ ϕ  ψ just if ψ holds at all ≤-minimal ϕ-states. It is this
semantic version of the AGM postulates that form the basis of the work we will now
summarise.
3.2 Belief dynamics
In the AGM paradigm, only one agent is considered, and the logical languages con-
sidered cannot refer to the beliefs of the agent. The epistemic approach based on
equivalence relations can be extended by adding pre-orders to the models, giving us
a natural way of representing multi-agent belief revision. These models are proposed
and discussed in Board (2002), van Benthem (2007a), Baltag and Smets (2008).
Definition 8 An epistemic-plausibility model for the agents N is a tuple (W,
(∼i ,≤i )i∈N , V ), where(W, (∼i )i∈N , V ) is an epistemic model and each ≤i is a well-
founded pre-order (reflexive and transitive relation) over W .
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Definition 9 (A priori/ a posteriori) Most plausible elements
• For all X ⊆ W , let βi (X) = min≤i (X) = {w : w is ≤i -minimal in X}.
• For all w ∈ W , let Bi [w] = βi (Ki [w]).
We write w Bi v iff v ∈ Bi [w], and w →Xi v iff v ∈ βi (Ki [w] ∩ X).
As in epistemic models, where common knowledge is an important concept, here
we will want to define common belief.
Definition 10 (Common belief) For each G ⊆ I , let ∗G be the reflexive-transitive
closure of
⋃
i∈G Bi . [w]∗G = {w′ ∈ W | w ∼∗G w′}.
3.3 Doxastic-epistemic logic
The logical language used in Baltag and Smets (2008) to describe epistemic-plausibil-
ity models is a propositional modal language with three families of modal operators,
which we extend here with “common belief” operators.
Definition 11 (Epistemic Doxastic Language) The language LE DL is defined as fol-
lows:
ϕ := p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | Kiϕ | Bϕi ϕ | C BGϕ,
where i ranges over N , p over a countable set of proposition letters prop and ∅ =
G ⊆ I .
We write ⊥ for p ∧ ¬p and  for ¬⊥. A formula Kiϕ should be read as “i knows
that ϕ”, C BGϕ as “it is common belief among group G that ϕ.” The formula Bϕi ψ ,
should be read “ conditional on ϕ, i believes that ψ .” These formulas are interpreted
in epistemic plausibility models as follows:
Definition 12 (Truth definition) We write ||ϕ||M for {w ∈ |M| : M, w  ϕ}. We
omit M when it is clear from the context.
M, w  Bψi ϕ iff ∀v(if w →||ψ ||
M
i v then M, v  ϕ)
M, w  C BGϕ iff ∀v(if w ∗G v then M, v  ϕ)
Simple belief conditional only on i’s information at a state w is definable using
the conditional belief operator: Biϕ = Bi ϕ, since: M, w  Bi ϕ iff ∀v(if w Bi
v then M, v  ϕ).
The advantages of the dynamic approach over the static syntactic approach of AGM
are threefold. Firstly, we find as in the case of PAL, that there is a solution to the prob-
lem of Moore sentences. That is, the Success Postulate  	 ϕ  ϕ fails in a contained
fashion, notably for blindspots. By dealing with epistemic states4, we also have a nat-
ural way of trearing iterated revision. Finally, the approach copes seemlessly with the
case of multiple agents.
4 i.e. including “pre-encoding” the information about how an agent will change her beliefs cf. van Benthem
(2007a).
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4 Game theory
A strategic game is an interactive decision process in which are specified the differ-
ent choices of action that the players have, and their preferences over the outcomes
of those (collective) choices. Players may have different first-order information and
beliefs about the state of the world but also, and just as importantly, they may have
different higher-order information and beliefs, i.e. information and beliefs about what
other agents know/believe.
Now assume that two players are to play a game for the first time together. Assume
that their preferences over outcomes are common knowledge between them. What
would be a ‘good’ or ‘correct’ decision? One possible answer is that they should
choose an action that survives so called ‘iterated elimination of strictly dominated
strategies’ (IESDS Osborne and Rubinstein 1994).
Theorem 13 (Tan and Werlang 1988) A choice c can rationally be chosen under
common true belief of rationality iff c survives IESDS.
This use of a decision-theoretic approach shifts the focus from the usual equilibrium
notions, i.e. Nash equilibrium and its refinements, to game reductions, and is part of
the epistemic program in game theory.
Equilibria re-emerge, however, in the form of fixpoints. Firstly, common knowl-
edge is itself a fixpoint, and secondly the iterative processes themselves implicitly
involve analyses in terms of fixpoints. This is revealed in two different ways in Apt
and Zvesper (2007), van Benthem (2007b). Apt and Zvesper (2007) provides a syntax
in terms of modal fixpoint languages for reasoning about rationality and elimination of
dominated strategies. van Benthem (2007b) takes a new and more dynamic perspec-
tive, analysing the algorithm of iteration itself as a series of public announcements
that the relevant strategies will not be played (because of the rationality of the players
involved). This leads to a partial answer to the question how the epistemic conditions,
like common belief of rationality, can come about. An important point here is that
after an announcement that players are rational it need not necessarily be the case
that the players are rational (notice the similarity with the case of Moore sentences).
However, the announcements will eventually stabilise, leading to the appropriate kind
of equilibrium.
More generally, games provide a good setting and test-bed for the merging of logics
of action, belief and preference. We now consider two case studies to illustrate the
interplay between (dynamic) logic and games.
5 Agreeing to disagree
In the setting we have introduced to encode the information and the beliefs of agents
we could say that the pre-order encodes the prior beliefs of agents about the state of the
world and that the cells of the epistemic partition encode the hard, private information
received by each agent. We have seen that in game theory higher-order beliefs have
a decisive status. Other areas where they are crucial include e.g. financial econom-
ics (roughly, can agents make use of private information when all agents value the
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Synthese (2011) 179:223–238 233
‘goods’ in the same way) and theories of competitive equilibrium under uncertainty.
A natural question (solved by Aumann (1976) for a natural probabilistic setting) can
be raised about epistemic plausibility models: namely, can agents agree to disagree?
More precisely, is it possible for it to be common knowledge between two agents with
the same prior beliefs that they have different beliefs about some facts of the world?
For the probablistic Aumann proved that this is impossible.
Theorem 14 (Aumann 1976) If two agents 1 and 2 have the same prior, then if it the
posterior probabilities they assigned to A are common knowledge between them at ω
then these posterior probabilities are equal.
Recently Dégremont and Roy (2009) proved that this is true also in the setting of
epistemic plausibility models in which the plausibility ordering is well-founded. In
fact they proved something stronger, namely that if it is common belief between two
agents that they have different (posterior) beliefs about some fact of the world, then
they have different priors.
Theorem 15 (Agreement theorem—Common Belief) If a well-founded epistemic
plausibility model M satisfies M, w  C B{i, j}(Bi p ∧ ¬B j p) for some w ∈ W ,
then i and j have different priors in M.
It is easy to see that this result implies that common knowledge of disagreement is
impossible in a well-founded epistemic plausibility model. Interestingly Dégremont
and Roy (2009) show that when well-foundedness is weakened to local-wellfounde-
ness (the plausibility ordering of every cell of the epistemic partition is well-founded)
the agreement theorem fails. The preceding theorem is a semantic result about episte-
mic plausibility models. Doxastic logics are naturally interpreted on epistemic plau-
sibility models (cf. Subsection 3.3 for an example of such a doxastic logic). Does it
mean that agreement theorems can be considered as theorems of some doxastic logic?
The answer is yes, but the logic has to be sufficiently expressive. In particular the basic
doxastic logic with common belief cannot define common prior.
Fact 16 The class of epistemic plausibility frames that satisfies common prior is not
definable in LE DL .
Dégremont and Roy (2009) give a (finite) formal axiomatic derivation in some
hybrid logic. However the validities of this logic itself are not recursively enumerable,
ruling out the possibility of giving a finite complete axiomatization of its validities.
Finally the paper addresses the issue of whether disagreeing agents with the same
plausibility ordering (same prior) will reach agreement by iteratively communicating
their beliefs for a sufficiently long time. It is shown that in particular in the case of
communicating through public announcements agreement will be reached.
6 Backward induction
Extensive games, sometimes called “dynamic games”, also lend themselves naturally
to analysis in terms of belief dynamics. An extensive game is a tree, with each non-
terminal node v being a decision point for one player ρ(v), and each terminal node o
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Fig. 5 An extensive game
being an “outcome”, over which the players have preferences in the same way as in a
strategic (or “static”) game: o <i o′ means that player i strictly prefers the outcome o′
over o. The difference between static and dynamic games is that in the latter, players
could in principle change their beliefs as the game is played. So this is naturally an
area where logics of belief change can be applied.
In (finite) extensive-form games of perfect information, a standard solution concept
is ‘backward induction’, which has the pleasant feature that for “generic” games (in
which each player’s preference relation is strict), it yields a unique solution. For a
formal definition of backward induction see Osborne and Rubinstein (1994).
Aumann (1995) provided an epistemic foundation for backward induction that has
since been criticised, notably by Stalnaker (1996).5 What Aumann showed is that com-
mon knowledge of “substantive rationality” entails the backward induction outcome.
Substantive rationality means rationality, at every node. Halpern (2001) argues persua-
sively that ambiguities in the way “substantive rationality” can be understood explain
the difference between Aumann and Stalnaker’s views. To understand the objections
raised to Aumann’s putative epistemic foundation, it can help to consider the simple
game in Fig. 5. Inuitively speaking, Aumann’s argument looks like this: Assume com-
mon knowledge of (substantive) rationality. Then in particular, a is rational at her last
decision node, and so will play down, since 4 > 3. Since all this is common knowl-
edge, b knows that a will go down, and so he will play down, since 3 > 2. Then a
knows all of the above, so knows she has a choice between 0 and 2; clearly rationality
means that she will choose 2, i.e. play down. All seems well, but notice now that it
cannot have been possible to have (common knowledge of) substantive rationality at
a’s last decision node, since the argument just given proves that reaching that decision
node contradicts common knowledge of substantive rationality!
Nonetheless, backward induction does make sense, and there surely must be some
condition on their beliefs that will mean players arrive at the backward induction out-
come. What was not explicitly present in Aumann’s analysis was the idea that players
must reason that if they were to reach such-and-such node, then they would all still
be rational. The reasoning behind the backward induction algorithm therefore invokes
some notion of counterfactual belief. This idea has been explored in the game-theo-
retical literature, and a number of ad-hoc frameworks have been proposed along these
lines (for example by Samet (1996), Arieli (2008)), but from the way we have pre-
5 A great deal of literature exists on the epistemic foundations of backward induction, going back before
these two papers; we do not attempt any kind of survey here, but Bicchieri (1989) and Binmore (1987) are
important early contributions.
123
Synthese (2011) 179:223–238 235
sented backward induction reasoning, it should be clear that doxastic-epistemic logic
will help give a formal analysis.
And indeed an analysis in terms of doxastic-epistemic logic with public announce-
ment operators allows us to cash out these intuitions in a straighforward formal frame-
work. Baltag et al. (2009) define a logical language with announcement operators [!ϕ]
and [!] (for “arbitrary announcements”, see Sect. 2), and prove that common knowl-
edge of “stable belief” in “dynamic rationality” entails common belief in the backward
induction outcome.6 “Dynamic rationality” means forward-looking rationality, i.e. the
past history is entirely ignored. Stable belief is belief that is invariant under acquired
information: that is, no matter what is learned (announced), the belief is maintained.
Formally, stable belief is an operator defined by composing the arbitrary announcement
and belief operators: [!]B.
The authors also introduce stable true belief, Stbiϕ, defined as Ki [!]Biϕ ∧ [!]ϕ,
and show that the weaker and simpler condition of common stable true belief of ratio-
nality is sufficient to entail the backward induction outcome. Stable true belief is an
interesting epistemic notion in its own right: it is positively introspective, but not neg-
atively introspective, and indeed when applied to ontic facts (basic propositions p), it
coincides with what Stalnaker (2006) calls “knowledge”. (There is divergence when
it comes to non-ontic facts, i.e. facts with some epistemic content, that might change
when some announcement is made.)
We can think of the condition of stable belief as partially constraining the players’
“belief revision policies”: it is a sort of ‘optimism’, according to which irrespective of
what true information they receive about what happens in the game, including perhaps
information that contradicts rationality, they will maintain the belief that players will
be rational.
7 Further directions
The interplay between game theory and logic represented by these two case studies
continues a tradition instantiated by a number of other authors. For example the work
of de Bruin (2004), who provides a purely syntactic approach to the analysis of solu-
tion concepts in a formal logical language, is in this tradition, as is that of Pauly (2001),
who analyses coalitional games from a logical perspective.
Knowledge and its dynamics are also very important in computer science, as has
been recognised by research since the 80s, documented in Fagin et al. (1995).
Some recent work (Hendricks 2001; Dégremont and Gierasimczuk 2009) considers
the interface between DEL and formal learning theory. By analysing the temporal dox-
astic structure underlying formal learning theory, this approach provides additional
insight into the semantics of inductive learning. By importing the ideas, problems
and methodology from Learning Theory, logics of epistemic and doxastic change get
enriched by new (inductive) learning scenarios, new concepts and new problematic
perspectives.
6 And if rationality is added as a condition then the players will actually play that backward induction
outcome.
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Other issues with philosophical significance include the phenomena of intention
and preference change. Girard (2008) extensively analyses logics of preferences, in
particular presenting a logic of ‘ceteris paribus’ preference, where ‘ceteris paribus’
is given the reading ‘everything else being equal’. Ceteris paribus logic can also be
applied to interpretations of the modality other than preference. Liu (2008) considers
dynamic logics of preference change and Roy (2008) formalises different notions of
intention and examines also their dynamics. Roy argues that intention can be used to
explain the phenomenon of coordination in so-called ‘Hi-Lo’ games, i.e., coordination
games in which there exists a Pareto-dominant Nash equilibrium.
This is a burgeoning area in which there are many further topics to be explored.
We anticipate that in the future interaction-oriented logics will embrace the prob-
lem of belief merge, as well as put in evidence and analyze the epistemic aspects of
cooperative game theory and social choice theory.
The dynamic-epistemic project internalizes information flow, belief change, induc-
tive or strategic reasoning into the formal language, bringing the logical analysis of the
informational dimension of interaction one step further. In this paper we have sketched
some applications of DEL that illustrate how it constitutes a natural foundation for a
logical theory of rational and intelligent interaction.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncom-
mercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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